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Abstract 
In December 2006, Indonesian Health Minister, Siti Fadilah Supari, shocked the world when 
announcing her government would no longer be sharing samples of the H5N1 avian flu virus, 
collected from Indonesian patients, with the World Health Organization, at a time when 
global fears of a deadly influenza pandemic were running high. For observers of Southeast 
Asian politics, the decision reinforced the view of the region as made up of states determined 
to protect their national sovereignty, at almost all costs. This established view of the region, 
however, generally neglects the variable and selective manner in which sovereignty has been 
invoked by Southeast Asian governments, or parts thereof, and fails to identify the conditions 
shaping the deployment of sovereignty. In this article, it is argued that Siti’s action was 
designed to harness claims of sovereignty to a domestic political struggle. It was a response 
to the growing fragmentation and, in some cases, denationalisation of the governance 
apparatus dealing with public health in Indonesia, along with the ‘securitisation’ of H5N1 
internationally. The examination of the virus-sharing dispute demonstrates that in Southeast 
Asia sovereignty is not so much the ends of government action, but the means utilised by 
government actors for advancing particular political goals. 
 
                                                          
1 The final version of this article is published in The Pacific Review 27, no. 3 (2014), pp. 333-56. Funding for 
this project has been generously provided by an Australian Research Council grant DP110100425. 
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Introduction 
In December 2006, then Indonesian Health Minister, Siti Fadilah Supari, shocked the world 
when announcing her government would no longer be sharing samples of the H5N1 highly 
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus, collected from Indonesian patients, with the World 
Health Organization (WHO). The decision disrupted the longstanding Global Influenza 
Surveillance Network (GISN) – the WHO-coordinated international regime for managing 
seasonal and pandemic influenza – at a time when global fears of a deadly H5N1 pandemic in 
humans were running very high. GISN was premised on countries sharing virus specimens 
freely with the WHO, which then sent them to reference laboratories for assessment. The 
specimens ultimately ended up in the hands of pharmaceutical companies, which produced 
vaccines and sold these back to governments at a profit. Controversially, Siti claimed 
Indonesian sovereignty over viruses collected within Indonesia. She further justified her 
action by arguing that GISN was deeply unfair towards developing countries and that the 
governments and populations of these countries, because of their sovereign right over ‘their’ 
viruses, were entitled to a greater share of the benefits from the production of vaccines made 
with these viruses. Horrified international observers accused Siti of undermining global 
health security for narrow national interests (e.g. Holbrooke and Garrett 2008; Fidler 2007a). 
The virus-sharing dispute led to an intense period of international negotiations, concluding in 
May 2011 with the ratification of a new agreement by the World Health Assembly (WHA).       
For many seasoned observers of Southeast Asian politics, Siti’s decision was no 
shock at all, as it seemed to fit the broader picture of a region dedicated to the preservation of 
national sovereignty, at almost all costs. A near-consensus exists in the literature that the 
region’s states are highly resistant to encroachments on their national sovereignty. The norm 
of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states, also known as the ‘ASEAN Way’, 
is seen by many to be an almost sacred principle in the region (Acharya 2009; Haacke 2003; 
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Leifer 1989; Narine 2006). Growing economic interdependence, along with the emergence or 
worsening of a range of trans-boundary, ‘non-traditional’ security (NTS) issues in recent 
decades – infectious disease, environmental degradation, climate change, transnational crime, 
and Islamist terrorism – are seen to have tested this commitment. But most observers 
nevertheless concur that the region’s preference for harder, ‘Westphalian’, forms of national 
sovereignty has been maintained, even in the face of serious transnational threats, whose 
amelioration necessitates coordinated international action (Caballero-Anthony 2005, 2008; 
Acharya 2009; Maier-Knapp 2011; Stevenson and Cooper 2009; Kamradt-Scott and Lee 
2011).  
Yet, a closer inspection of the response to H5N1 in Indonesia suggests that this 
established view of the region cannot fully explain Siti’s actions. In fact, Indonesian 
‘sovereignty’ in health governance had already been considerably undermined beforehand, 
and significant interventions persisted even after the virus-sharing dispute. While Siti’s 
refusal to share human viruses received much attention, it is striking that the sharing of H5N1 
viruses from poultry with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) had never ceased, 
while the cooperation between WHO and Indonesian health officials within Indonesia was 
generally also unaffected. Furthermore, massive internationally funded interventions, to 
facilitate better local capacity for surveillance of and response to outbreaks, have been 
implemented in subnational animal and human health services.  
What this mixed picture, in which intervention and non-intervention are both present, 
demonstrates is that rather than the Indonesian government’s dedication to protecting national 
sovereignty explaining the virus-sharing dispute, it is Siti’s invocation of sovereignty that 
actually needs to be explained. Scholars’ insistence on characterising the Southeast Asian 
region in terms of states’ dedication to Westphalian sovereignty risks neglecting important 
developments occurring underneath the surface of inter-state relations that could explain the 
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usage of sovereignty by governments. So rather than being assumed away, Siti’s move needs 
to be situated within the broader contemporary contestation over power and resources 
shaping state-society relations, as well as the very nature of statehood, in Indonesia. 
The starting point for this analysis is to recognise the political, contested and 
potentially shifting nature of sovereignty ‘regimes’ – the historically specific arrangements 
regularising patterns of intervention and non-intervention in a region, or worldwide (see 
Agnew 2009). Rather than an end in itself, sovereignty is better understood as ‘a strategic 
tool to define the scope of political conflict, to determine which forces are included within a 
particular struggle for power’ (Jones 2012: 16). As in many initially unstable postcolonial 
states, Southeast Asian governments have for decades used sovereignty and ‘national 
security’ selectively as a means of protecting their preferred domestic social and political 
orders. In ASEAN, this was mainly directed during the Cold War at shoring up fledgling 
capitalist regimes, by preventing communist challengers within from joining forces with 
counterparts across borders. In the post-Cold War era, and especially since the Asian crisis, 
however, the region’s sovereignty regime has been far less coherent, reflecting rising intra-
elite divisions and the effects of globalisation (Jones 2012). Assertions of national 
sovereignty are now made by different parts of the state, at different times, in different 
contexts, for different purposes, and at times at cross-purposes. Indeed, the social and 
political orders that sovereignty assertions are meant to support have not remained static in 
Southeast Asia, and neither has the region’s sovereignty regime. Therefore, the ends served 
by the use of sovereignty in the region should not be presupposed, but rather its mobilisation 
in particular contexts deserves explanation.  
Specifically, I argue that Siti’s action was designed to harness claims of sovereignty 
to a domestic political struggle, but the scope of ‘domestic’ politics, in relation to public 
health issues, has significantly changed over the past decade. The virus-sharing ban was a 
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response to the growing fragmentation and, in some cases, denationalisation of the 
governance apparatus dealing with public health in Indonesia, along with the ‘securitisation’ 
of H5N1 internationally. The fragmentation of Indonesia’s health governance has sucked 
authority and funding out of the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Jakarta, already relatively weak 
vis-à-vis other government departments, rendering it one of many organisations vying for 
influence and funding in the management of infectious disease. The securitisation of H5N1 
internationally provided the opportunity for this power grab, by raising the perceived stakes 
associated with mismanaging the disease and making considerable amounts of international 
funding available (Elbe 2010).  
Viewed in this way, Siti’s decision to withhold viruses, citing national sovereignty, 
represents one of many positions in a complex struggle over power and resources, played out 
through contestation over the appropriate governance arrangements through which 
transnational problems, like H5N1, should be dealt with. It was essentially an attempt to 
reassert control over public health agendas and funding, not by tackling domestic opponents 
head-on – too difficult an undertaking for the MoH, particularly when powerful interests 
relating to agribusiness and livestock industries were involved – but by shifting the conflict to 
an intergovernmental arena. At the WHO, the MoH was the sole Indonesian representative, 
and the adjustments it sought in GISN would have made it a key player in the management of 
future international funds relating to vaccine production and attendant benefits. Siti’s 
sovereignty assertion also had the effect of muscling out the MoH’s main rival for supremacy 
within Indonesian infectious disease surveillance and research networks – the United States 
Naval Area Medical Research Unit No. 2 (NAMRU-2). This recentralisation attempt had a 
particular ideological appeal to Siti – an ardent supporter of Sukarno-style anti-imperialism 
and Pancasila.  
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I follow by looking at the broader context of health governance in Indonesia today, to 
identify the factors that promoted and constrained Siti’s power-grab. I then demonstrate that 
Siti’s invocation of sovereignty was not simply a reaction to international intervention in 
Indonesia’s domestic affairs, by showing the extent to which encroachments on Indonesian 
sovereignty had already occurred prior to the virus-sharing dispute, including with MoH 
complicity. Finally, I will analyse of the politics of ‘viral sovereignty’.  
The notable example of the virus-sharing dispute shows that sovereignty is a means 
used by governmental actors to advance particular political goals. It also highlights the need 
to pay greater attention than the literature currently affords to the changing domestic context 
shaping the conditions in which sovereignty is mobilised by Southeast Asian governments, 
particularly the implications of the emergence of increasingly fragmented and transnationally 
penetrated states.  
 
The fragmentation of health governance in Indonesia 
The governance arrangements associated with the management of public health in Indonesia 
have fragmented considerably over the preceding decade or so. Particularly in the area of 
infectious disease surveillance and response, we now see a wide range of state and non-state 
agencies jostling for turf and funding from domestic and international sources. In this 
context, as the virus-sharing case demonstrates, sovereignty claims are becoming less 
coherent too – not so much attached to an overarching national agenda but reflecting specific 
contestations over authority and control of resources, involving government ministries or 
sections thereof and associated societal interests.  
The fragmentation of Indonesia’s health governance apparatus is a result of two 
interrelated processes. The first is the emergence of more regulatory global health 
governance. This process is primarily reflected in, but in fact precedes, the arrival of the 
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WHO’s revised 2005 International Health Regulations (IHRs), which came into force in 
2007. The second process is the significant decentralisation of government in Indonesia from 
2001. These processes have rendered the MoH one of many agencies vying for funding and 
authority within a fragmented and partly transnationalised Indonesian health governance 
system. This context, as we shall see in the following sections, explains both the MoH’s 
mobilisation of sovereignty and its support for international intervention. I discuss the two 
processes below. 
 
Regulatory global health governance 
According to Fidler (2007b), we are witnessing a tentative shift from what he calls 
‘Westphalian’ international health governance to ‘post-Westphalian’ global health 
governance. This is particularly reflected in the changing nature of the IHRs. The now-
defunct 1969 IHRs focused on the management of international contact-points – airports, 
border-crossings and ports – and only required governments to notify the WHO of outbreaks 
of six infectious diseases – cholera, the plague, relapsing fever, smallpox, typhus and yellow 
fever – while the WHO was obliged to rely only on information provided by governments. 
The 2003 SARS outbreak proved a watershed moment in the transformation of international 
health governance. In particular, the Chinese government’s initial cover-up of the outbreaks 
and subsequent refusal to cooperate with the WHO was seen to have allowed the pathogen to 
spread, reaching as far as Toronto within days (Fidler 2003). The international response to 
SARS saw the WHO take on new coordinating capacities vis-à-vis governments, as well as 
issue unilateral travel warnings unlike ever before (Kamradt-Scott 2011). While some 
tentative steps towards a less ‘state-centric’ system were already evident in WHA Resolution 
54.14 (2001), following the outbreak WHA Resolution 56.28 (2003) was unanimously 
passed, calling for the IHRs to be revised, and describing the then existing IHRs as 
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‘inadequate’, in failing to specify the responsibilities of states and the WHO when outbreaks 
occur (Davies 2012: 593).  
The revised IHRs place a greater focus on the quality and capacities of domestic 
health systems in the management of infectious disease for the broader benefit of global 
health security, specifying the competences states need to have to be prepared for epidemics.
They also provide the WHO with the authority to obtain information from nongovernmental 
sources and declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) (Kamradt-
Scott 2011). Unlike their predecessors, the revised IHRs do not attempt to specify which 
infectious diseases could be designated as PHEIC, giving the WHO discretionary powers on 
the basis of information from the field.    
The emergence of regulatory global health governance has coincided with the trend 
for the ‘securitisation’ of infectious disease (Davies 2008; Elbe 2009; McInnes and Lee 
2006). Many now note that some public health issues, mainly rapidly spreading infectious 
diseases, have come to be seen as ‘pressing existential threats that require urgent and 
extraordinary international policy responses’, thus ‘abandoning the decades-old convention of 
equating security with the absence of armed conflict between states’ (Elbe 2009: 2). The 
securitisation of infectious disease has undoubtedly led to an increasing emphasis upon, and 
rising funding allocated by the governments of richer countries towards, programs aimed at 
improving the capacities of developing countries for surveillance of and response to emerging 
infectious diseases (Calain 2007; Smith 2012; Lakoff 2008).  
For example, in the international effort to combat H5N1 more than $2 billion were in 
2006 pledged by donors, such as the US, European Union, Japan and Australia (Scoones 
2010). As a result, substantial funds were spent in countries where outbreaks had occurred, 
approximately $130 million of which in Indonesia – the hardest-hit country (Forster 2010: 
131). That such significant amounts were allocated to combat a disease that at that point had 
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only killed a relatively small number of humans was a direct result of the tendency to treat 
H5N1 as a pressing security problem with a particularly devastating potential (Elbe 2010; see 
Davis 2005).           
The fragmentation of Indonesian health governance promoted by these trends was 
further exacerbated by the growing concern among public health experts and epidemiologists 
with the risk of zoonoses – pathogens crossing the species boundary from animals to humans.  
Zoonoses are believed to account for about 60 per cent of all emerging infectious diseases 
between 1940 and 2004 (Scoones 2010: 3), including the main recent outbreaks of SARS, 
H5N1, H1N1 (‘swine flu’), the Nipah virus and the Hendra virus. The result has been not 
only increasingly close cooperation between international organisations such as the WHO, 
FAO, the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and the World Bank, as reflected in 
the ‘One World, One Health’ agenda (FAO et al. 2008), but also the incorporation of a 
dazzling range of governmental and nongovernmental agencies within countries like 
Indonesia into the effort to combat infectious diseases. Since preventing pandemics is seen to 
require capacity for surveillance and response in wild, domestic and livestock animals, and as 
the incidence of zoonoses is arguably affected by issues like climate change and 
deforestation, the scope of what constitutes ‘domestic health governance’ in relation to 
infectious disease management has expanded dramatically in recent years (see Coker et al. 
2011). This expansion has also had the effect of giving powerful interests associated with 
livestock and other agribusiness industries a strong stake in the way that some infectious 
diseases are managed (Vu 2011).  
Within Indonesia, therefore, managing infectious diseases is no longer the sole 
purview of the Directorate-General of Disease Control within the MoH – the lead agency 
under the old IHRs. Tellingly, the scope of that office has expanded to include 
‘environmental health’ and a new sub-departmental unit specialising in zoonoses was 
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established with the explicit objective of coordinating activities with other government 
departments, mainly in the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). But in a reflection of the 
multitude of interests and forms of expertise now attached to controlling infectious diseases, 
following the H5N1 outbreaks the Indonesian government set up the National Committee for 
Avian Influenza (Komnas FBPI) in 2006 and more recently the National Committee for 
Zoonoses (Komnas Zoonosis). Komnas FBPI, disbanded in early 2010, was a ministerial-
level committee led by the Coordinating Ministry for People’s Welfare. It also included the 
ministers for health, agriculture, forestry, national planning, and industry, the Coordinating 
Minister for Economics, the commander of the armed forces, the police chief, and the chair of 
the Indonesian Red Cross. It had a secretariat led by the Vice-Minister of Agriculture and six 
task-forces, involving scientists and other experts, meant to provide direction on research and 
development, animal health, human health, vaccine and anti-viral medicines, and mass 
communications and public information (Forster 2010: 145). Individual ministries retained 
their control of operating budgets, however, and also in most cases maintained independent 
relationships with international funding bodies.  
On top of this, many nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have also been funded 
to participate, mainly in surveillance and communication activities. For example, NGO the 
Center for Indonesian Veterinary Analytical Studies (CIVAS) was donor-funded to conduct 
research into the incidence of H5N1 along the poultry production and marketing chain.  
 
Decentralisation and health governance in Indonesia  
Further driving the fragmentation of health governance in Indonesia has been the process of 
government decentralisation. In Indonesia, decentralisation was adopted under international 
pressure in the early post-Suharto era by the weak Habibie government and implemented 
from 2001 (Hadiz 2010: 23). It represented a radical break from the pre-existing highly 
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centralised authoritarian order. Indonesia’s decentralisation laws devolve many previously 
centrally located responsibilities and resources to the district (kabupaten) or more rarely to 
provincial levels of government. In particular, a substantial proportion of tax revenue now 
flows to, and is managed at, the district level. In most cases, however, rather than promote 
neoliberal ‘good governance’ – government accountability, transparency and efficient use of 
public monies – as it was purported to do, decentralisation has empowered local predatory 
politico-business interests now posing as democratic leaders or defenders of particular ethnic 
groups and traditions (Hadiz 2010). Many of these local elites were ironically nurtured earlier 
by the highly centralised New Order regime. These well-placed elites were able to capture the 
benefits of decentralisation for themselves and their supporters, marginalising opponents 
through various means, including ‘money politics’ and the use of violence and intimidation. 
Instead of reducing corruption by making governance participatory, decentralisation has 
markedly increased corruption at the local level and made it very unpredictable compared 
with the Suharto era. Corrupt practices have in many cases become a crucial component of 
contests over control of local state apparatuses and associated resources, as well as for 
maintaining localised predatory patronage networks, upon which political power often 
depends (Hadiz 2010: 36-38).    
The decentralisation of government has had two major implications in the context of 
infectious disease management. First, international donors have had to develop multilevel 
governance approaches to counter the fragmenting tendencies of Indonesia’s decentralisation. 
Indeed, as one FAO official in Jakarta recounts, ‘The central government has little or no 
outreach. We therefore work though Dinas [local government department] locally’ (Interview 
2011a). This has led to the emergence of new governance networks, connecting particular 
units within government departments across various levels in the service of managing 
specific public health concerns, with donors acting as coordinators. Second, those seeking to 
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deflect the scrutiny associated with the international response to infectious diseases have 
often done so by keeping governance at the district or province levels and in the hands of 
local officials (Charnoz and Forster 2011). On the other hand, key Jakarta ministries, which 
now often find themselves powerless vis-à-vis lower levels of government, have selectively 
attempted to harness activities related to the management of H5N1 and other infectious 
diseases in order to bolster the territorial and functional reach of their authority. They have 
also sought to blame decentralisation for their failures in managing H5N1. Siti, for example, 
argued: 
Vietnam, as a centralised socialist country, can get high compliance on national 
policies and so has succeeded, for example, in implementing rapid culling of 
birds… In contrast, Indonesia is in transition towards a decentralized democracy 
after three decades of authoritarian national rule. We are still on a learning curve, 
and compliance of the relatively independent regional authorities with national 
policies is often poor (Butler 2007). 
 The fragmentation of Indonesia’s health governance I describe is essential to 
understand to make sense of Siti’s power-grab in the virus-sharing dispute and her use of 
national sovereignty. This is in terms of the motivation for this action, its objectives and the 
constraints on its achievements. In the next section, I develop my argument by demonstrating 
that Siti’s actions cannot be explained simply as part of an overarching preference in 
Indonesian government for protecting national sovereignty. This is because considerable 
interventions associated with the management of H5N1 had existed before and during the 
virus-sharing dispute, including with MoH complicity.  
 
International intervention in the governance of H5N1 in Indonesia 
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Siti Fadilah Supari’s decision to discontinue the sharing of H5N1 specimens with the WHO is 
typically viewed as a reassertion of Indonesian sovereignty over the WHO’s supranational 
authority. It is often argued that following a brief ‘post-Westphalian’ moment, resulting from 
the SARS shock, states have reasserted their national sovereignty over the WHO’s 
supranational authority, with detrimental consequences to global efforts to deal with the threat 
of infectious disease (Calain 2007; Stevenson and Cooper 2009; Kamradt-Scott 2011; Smith 
2012). Siti’s virus-sharing dispute is viewed as the most significant manifestation of this 
nationalist backlash, as she was seen to challenge even her country’s basic responsibility to 
cooperate with the WHO (Fidler 2010).  
Indeed, Southeast Asia as a whole is often viewed as a region of states particularly 
determined to uphold their national sovereignty against external intervention. A key tenet of 
the now-famous concept, ‘the ASEAN Way’, is the commitment of governments in the region 
to refrain from interference in the domestic matters of member-states (see Acharya 2009). In 
health governance, Southeast Asian states’ perceived failure to cooperate in managing trans-
boundary infectious diseases has been blamed on this apparently outdated commitment to 
‘Westphalian’ national sovereignty (Caballero-Anthony 2008; Maier-Knapp 2011).  
 By contrast, I argue that the virus-sharing ban was not simply a reassertion of national 
sovereignty against rising supranational authority. It was rather a strategic attempt to 
recentralise authority and funding within the MoH, after much of it had leaked out as a result 
of the fragmentation of health governance in Indonesia, in a context in which large amounts 
of funding were available internationally due to H5N1’s securitisation. The MoH was too 
weak to directly challenge many of its domestic rivals – particularly when backed by 
powerful interests from the poultry industry. It therefore sought to strengthen its deteriorating 
position by appropriating more funding from international sources through the selective use 
of national sovereignty. I demonstrate this claim in two steps. In this section, I show that the 
14 
pursuit of sovereignty per se cannot explain Siti’s actions, as significant interventions 
designed to improve local surveillance of and response to H5N1 infections in animals and 
humans were evident simultaneously with the virus-sharing dispute, including with MoH 
support. In the following, I examine the specific context in which ‘viral sovereignty’ claims 
were made by focusing on the ousting of NAMRU-2 from Indonesia, a key aspect of the 
virus-sharing ban imposed by Siti. The example of NAMRU-2, at the time the most advanced 
research lab of its kind in Indonesia, clearly shows that the MoH’s assertions of sovereignty 
were motivated by a concern for strengthening the relative position of the ministry within 
Indonesia’s fragmented and partly transnationalised health governance terrain.. 
 While Siti’s virus-sharing controversy grabbed world headlines, considerable 
international interventions into the governance of H5N1 in Indonesia persisted and even 
intensified. Specifically, large-scale international projects – the Participatory Disease 
Surveillance and Response (PDSR) and District Surveillance Officer (DSO) programs, 
managed by the Jakarta offices of the FAO and WHO respectively – were deployed to provide 
better surveillance of, and response, to H5N1 outbreaks at the local level. In developing and 
implementing these projects, the FAO and WHO partnered with, and received active support 
from, the MoA and MoH. The persistence of these interventions, even as the virus-sharing 
dispute was unfolding, demonstrates that there was more to Siti’s decision than protecting 
Indonesian national sovereignty.  
Below, I briefly describe PDSR and DSO. As we shall see, both programs manifested 
deep and multilayered interventions into the governance of H5N1 in Indonesia, by seeking to 
create animal and human health services at the local level, where these were often absent or 
severely underfunded, and by creating new functional networks connecting several levels of 
government in Indonesia in the service of combating H5N1.  
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The Participatory Disease Surveillance and Response program  
PDSR is the single largest H5N1-related international project in Indonesia, with a budget 
between 2005 and 2011 of nearly $55 million. Contemporarily, although the project officially 
exists, its much-reduced funding reflects the declining sense of urgency attached to H5N1 
worldwide. To give a sense of the scale of the program at its peak:  
From January 2006 to September 2008, PDSR teams, comprising over 2,000 
trained veterinarians and para-veterinarians, conducted over 177,300 
surveillance visits, detected 6,011 outbreaks of avian influenza in 324 districts, 
and met with over two million poultry farmers and community members… The 
program’s size is also reflected in the number of central staff positions involved. 
In May 2009, there were 15 international and 60 national staff/consultants 
employed by FAO, with a majority of them supporting the PDSR programme 
(Charnoz and Forster 2011: 69).  
PDSR officers, trained by FAO and OIE, are tasked with conducting passive and active 
surveillance of poultry illness in their area of responsibility, as well as village information 
campaigns. They are expected to develop relationships of trust with villagers, so that the 
latter would be willing to report suspicious chicken deaths. When there is reasonable concern 
of an outbreak, PDSR officers report to the Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC), which is 
tasked with investigating and responding. PDSR is coordinated by the Campaign 
Management Unit (CMU) – a designated office within the MoA’s Directorate-General of 
Livestock Services. FAO consultants played a key role in designing the CMU and maintain a 
regular presence within the unit. 
 PDSR was reportedly foisted upon the FAO, mainly by the American government 
(see Charnoz and Forster 2011: 81). Its objectives, however, were also premised on the 
central government’s National Strategic Work Plan (NSWP), in which ‘backyard’ poultry 
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was identified as a key priority. Donors essentially accepted the emphasis on backyard 
poultry, although supporting evidence was absent. As a result, PDSR was entirely focused on 
backyard poultry until late 2008 (Perry et al. 2009: 29). Furthermore, the program was 
explicitly developed as a means of building the capacity of district animal health services at a 
time of perceived emergency – a service which was usually under-funded and often non-
existent. Because of decentralisation, PDSR’s planners viewed direct engagement at the local 
level as essential. Indeed, in reflection of the tenacious struggles between local and national 
elites over control of rents from agricultural and livestock industries, the line of authority 
from the central MoA to local agricultural Dinas has in most cases broken down completely. 
The implementation of PDSR created new functional networks connecting the national CMU 
and local offices, with a specific focus on managing H5N1. 
As long as PDSR remained focused on the backyard sector it was described as an 
‘iconic success’ (Perry et al. 2009: 26), and cooperation with governments at all levels was 
very good. But since the program began to be partly reorientated towards the commercial 
sector from late 2008, as evidence of the disease’s circulation in farms began to accumulate 
and due to the recommendations of a 2009 external review, results have been very modest, 
and cooperation, particularly with local governments, began to break down (Charnoz and 
Forster 2011). A pilot project was developed within PDSR, conducted in only six layer farms, 
to develop cost-effective bio-security measures. It aimed to establish trust with industry so 
that farmers would allow vets to visit when outbreaks occur in farms, as well as build the 
capacity of local vets to profile the commercial poultry industry in their area. Participation 
was entirely voluntary, however, and farmers were unenthusiastic. Engagement with broiler 
farms was not even attempted, as PDSR officials assessed the chances of success there to be 
exceptionally low. This is because vaccinating broiler chickens is practically impossible and 
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Indonesian farmers have rejected large-scale culling, with local governments siding with 
farmers and the central MoA declining to force the issue.  
 
The District Surveillance Officer program 
While the implementation of the large-scale PDSR program already demonstrates that the 
virus-sharing dispute cannot be explained in terms of a blanket reassertion of Indonesian 
sovereignty, the DSO program shows that even the MoH under Siti’s leadership was not 
averse to supporting substantial external intervention in the governance of H5N1 in Indonesia, 
thus raising the question addressed in the following section of why sovereignty was invoked 
by the MoH in relation to virus-sharing.  
The USAID-funded DSO program was modelled on PDSR and was meant to work 
alongside PDSR surveillance teams on the ground (Perry et al. 2009: 22; USAID 2008: 11). It 
operated on a much smaller scale, however – in 8 provinces and just over 90 districts 
particularly prone to H5N1 outbreaks, compared with PDSR’s 29 provinces and thousands of 
villages. Like PDSR, the DSO program increased the capacity of both the WHO and the 
central government, the MoH in this case, to monitor local infectious disease outbreaks and 
intervene if necessary. A senior MoH bureaucrat described DSO as the ‘focal point of central 
government surveillance’ (Indriyono 2011). DSOs were meant to maintain regular 
surveillance at the local level, not only of H5N1 outbreaks, but also other infectious diseases. 
From the MoH’s perspective the program’s utility was not in reasserting central leadership 
over local health Dinas offices, which remain generally intact, but in increasing central MoH 
involvement in the management of H5N1 in poultry at the district level. The program allowed 
the MoH to increase its capacity to operate locally, with MoH and WHO representatives 
present in the investigation of outbreaks in poultry, even when human infections were not 
immediately observed. That the same program also improved the WHO’s own surveillance of 
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H5N1 infections in Indonesia was not seen as an issue by MoH officials in this case and 
sovereignty concerns were not raised.  
Indeed, rather than ousting the WHO and other donors when launching the virus-
sharing dispute, the MoH appeared quite eager to increase their involvement, albeit in ways 
that bolstered its relative strength vis-à-vis other actors vying for authority and funding in 
infectious disease governance. As Davies (2012) shows through empirical analysis, 
notwithstanding Siti’s firebrand rhetoric, the Indonesian MoH reported to the WHO, whether 
formally or informally, nearly all H5N1 outbreaks during the virus-sharing crisis and 
cooperation between the MoH and the WHO domestically did not break down. A 2008 
USAID report, at the height of the virus-sharing crisis, noted, for example, that a ‘well-
established and close working relationship appears to exist between the Indonesian MOH and 
the WHO in Indonesia’ (USAID 2008: 13). This observation was also confirmed to this 
author by several top-level interviewees from MoH and WHO in Jakarta in late 2011.  
 
The politics of ‘viral sovereignty’ 
That such large-scale and intrusive interventions in the governance of H5N1 in Indonesia 
coincided with Siti’s decision to withhold virus samples does not support the claim that the 
virus-sharing dispute was about the protection of Indonesian national sovereignty. It is rather 
my argument that the invocation of sovereignty by the MoH in this case was a strategic move 
to recentralise authority and funding, in a context of highly fragmented health governance in 
Indonesia, within which the MoH was increasingly marginalised.   
But before we examine the MoH’s deployment of sovereignty, it is essential first to 
evaluate two other potential explanations for Siti’s actions, which go beyond the simplistic 
notion that it was a typical Indonesian assertion of national sovereignty: (a) that Siti’s 
decision reflected her personal beliefs and somewhat erratic personality; and (b) that it was a 
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reaction to the international securitisation of H5N1. Both offer useful, but partial, insights into 
the virus-sharing dispute and Siti’s claims of ‘viral sovereignty’.  
To be sure, the virus-sharing dispute sat well with Siti’s unquestionable personal 
preference for the ideology of anti-imperialism and self-reliance espoused by Indonesia’s first 
President, Sukarno – an ideology instrumental in the formation of the Non-Aligned 
Movement at the 1955 Bandung Asia-Africa Conference and the subsequent emergence of 
the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Acharya 2009: 54-55). It also sat well with Siti’s proclivity for 
conspiracy theories, involving the US government in particular (Lowe 2010: 161). For 
example, in a book written at the height of the virus-sharing dispute, Siti (2008: 34) 
proclaimed:  
Was this the neo-colonialism predicted by Soekarno, the first President of 
Indonesia, 50 years ago, when the incapability or the powerlessness of a nation 
can be the source of prosperity for other nation? Was the sharing of influenza 
viruses with the WHO, which had been implemented since 1952 under the 
control of the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) also implied the 
same scheme?   
This rhetoric also found many supporters in Indonesia and other developing countries, making 
Siti a popular public figure – unusual for an Indonesian Health Minister. Nonetheless, Siti’s 
nationalism is not enough in itself to explain her actions, as it would then be difficult to 
account for the MoH’s promotion of the DSO program at the same time. Clearly, the MoH, 
under Siti’s leadership, was not entirely averse to international intervention to manage H5N1, 
and to WHO involvement specifically.  
Another explanation, provided most explicitly by Stefan Elbe (2010; also Forster 
2010; Calain 2007), is that Siti was reacting to the ‘securitisation’ of H5N1 by the WHO and 
Western governments: 
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As fear about the threat of a possible human H5N1 pandemic spread across the 
world, many governments scrambled to stockpile anti-viral medications and 
vaccines, albeit in a context where there was insufficient global supply to meet 
such a rapid surge in demand. Realizing that they were the likely ‘losers’ in this 
international race, some developing countries began to openly question the 
benefits of maintaining existing forms of international health cooperation (Elbe 
2010: 476).     
In other words, Siti is seen to have acted unilaterally because the securitisation of H5N1 
made the disease a matter of national security for the governments of other states, which also 
acted unilaterally to protect their own citizens. Securitisation is therefore seen to have 
simultaneously brought the inequality inherent in GISN into sharp relief and provided 
opportunities for the Indonesian government to exploit the world’s fear of a H5N1 pandemic.  
There is considerable merit in this argument. Note, for example, Siti’s (2008: 55) own 
words: ‘What were the benefits to Indonesia [of having the most virulent strain of H5N1]? 
Bargaining power! Yes, stronger bargaining power? Thank God.’ There is also strong 
evidence to suggest the virus-sharing dispute was opportunistic, rather than motivated by 
genuine concern for the effects of H5N1 on Indonesians’ health. Even at the height of the 
crisis in 2006 and 2007, the central government only devoted an average of $57 million, or 
1.7 per cent of the health budget, to controlling H5N1 (Curley and Herington 2011: 157). 
Health officials interviewed also insisted H5N1 was not a particular priority. One high-level 
MoH bureaucrat stated: ‘We have so many diseases – all of the diseases are a priority’ 
(Interview 2011b). Another explained that the Indonesian government submitted a list of 
health needs every year to the international community, but in the case of H5N1, ‘usually 
other governments [were] the ones who express they have the intention to help’ (Indriyono 
2011). And when the perceived sense of crisis attached to H5N1 dissipated worldwide, the 
21 
Indonesian government was very quick to drop the issue. When interviewed by the author, 
Emil Agustiono, the public servant given charge of the secretariat of the government’s new 
Komnas Zoonosis, cut a lonely figure. Without budget or staff, Emil (2011) lamented, ‘I wish 
the pandemic will come again’.             
Yet, while observers like Elbe have tended to focus on the international bargaining 
power provided by the securitisation of H5N1 to Indonesia, they have neglected for the most 
part to investigate its domestic significance (Curley and Herington 2011), and perhaps more 
importantly, the domestic context in which Siti’s decision was made. It is the interaction 
between the securitisation of H5N1, which led to substantial funds being made available to 
combat the disease internationally, with the fragmented and partly transnationalised 
Indonesian health governance system that has shaped Siti’s resort to ‘viral sovereignty’. 
The crucial factor shaping the MoH’s behaviour in the response to the H5N1 crisis, 
and its usage of sovereignty specifically, has been the ministry’s weakness vis-à-vis the MoA 
and local governments, resulting from its lack of powerful societal support-bases. In 
Indonesia, political power tends to be in the hands of predatory politico-business elites that 
rely on ‘money politics’ to fund systems of patronage that support their authority (Robison 
and Hadiz 2004). Thus, the MoA became a particularly important ministry in the pre-
decentralisation era, because it was responsible for regulating the lucrative agribusiness and 
livestock sectors. The formal and informal rents generated from these sectors, and the 
associated dispensation of licences to Suharto cronies, played an important part in the 
maintenance of the authoritarian New Order regime (see Robison 1986). After 
decentralisation, much of this authority was devolved to the districts and therefore conflicts 
between local and national authorities over control of benefits from these industries have 
become common and quite intense at times (Hadiz 2010). Poultry industry conglomerates 
have been able to exploit this competition by encouraging local officials to resist national 
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directives when these were detrimental to their commercial interests (Curley and Herington 
2011: 157; Charnoz and Forster 2011). At the same time, maintaining good relations with the 
MoA has remained important to big poultry producers operating in Indonesia and the large 
operators in the sector reportedly enjoy a close relationship with the ministry (Charnoz and 
Forster 2011: 90).  
In contrast, the MoH generally lacks links to powerful societal groups, as the activities 
it regulates and funds do not generate significant rent-seeking opportunities. While this has 
meant that the line of authority connecting the national MoH and local health Dinas, despite 
the devolution of approximately 80 per cent of the health budget, has not broken down in the 
same way as in agriculture, the MoH’s leverage within government and vis-à-vis powerful 
interests in society is typically quite weak. The MoH’s lack of powerful societal support-bases 
has made it particularly reliant on international funding for strengthening its relative position 
within Indonesian health governance, meaning it was particularly vulnerable to the effects of 
international funding leaking away to other parts of the state or to non-state actors.  
The international effort to combat H5N1 has comprised two primary governance 
agendas, with different implications for the response within Indonesia, and for the MoH’s use 
of sovereignty specifically. First, because H5N1 is a zoonosis that initially develops in 
poultry, programs, like PDSR and DSO, have been developed to provide surveillance of 
outbreaks in poultry, and response where possible, as well as identify its mechanisms of 
zoonotic transmission through surveillance of human cases at the source. Second, efforts have 
been made to study the avian flu virus and develop a vaccine (see Scoones and Forster 2010).  
In Indonesia, international funding was mainly funnelled into activities relating to the 
first agenda (see Lowe 2010), with the MoH finding itself marginalised for two main reasons. 
First, because H5N1 has not become easily transmissible between humans to-date, most 
international funding was directed into surveillance of and response to outbreaks in poultry. I 
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already mentioned in this respect that while the PDSR program was rolled out in 29 
provinces, its human health equivalent, the DSO program, was only implemented in eight. 
Second, the international emphasis on managing infections in poultry saw tensions rise 
between the MoH and MoA, leading to struggles over which would be the lead agency in 
managing the Indonesian response to H5N1. Due to its lack of powerful societal support-
bases, the MoH was in most cases the loser in these struggles, although most policymakers 
and practitioners viewed it as the more competent of the two ministries (Ear 2012: 181). In 
one prominent example, the Agriculture bureaucracy managed to assume the lead role, despite 
MoH resistance, in the administration of poultry culling, a practice to which the MoA was 
antagonistic (Curley and Herington 2011: 159). As a result, culling was only seldom deployed 
in Indonesia to manage H5N1, even though it was the preferred policy response of the OIE, 
FAO and WHO (see Scoones and Forster 2010). By most accounts, the MoA assumed this 
stance because of strong resistance from the Indonesian poultry industry, which exerted 
considerable influence on decision-making in the ministry (Charnoz and Forster 2011: 91). In 
fact, the poultry industry was so influential within the MoA that when Indonesia’s Director of 
Animal Health, Dr Tri Satya Putri Naipospos, told the media of the existence of H5N1 in 
Indonesian poultry she immediately lost her job (Lowe 2010: 169)!   
In the absence of similar links to powerful interests, the MoH had to rely to a greater 
extent on international pressure and funding to increase its authority in the domestic 
governance of H5N1, particularly at the local level. A top-level MoH official explains: ‘We 
can advocate and convince them [local governments], or we can provide funding... Pandemic 
preparedness has helped the centre have a bit more control over provinces and districts – 
particularly if we have the money’ (Indriyono 2011). This money, typically, came from 
external sources. This explains why the MoH did not use sovereignty to deny the 
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implementation of surveillance and response programs like DSO that had the potential of 
enhancing its control over local governments.     
By contrast, the MoH repeatedly raised sovereignty concerns in relation to activities 
associated with the second global agenda of developing a vaccine for humans. This was to 
marginalise competing medical research networks within Indonesia, centred primarily on the 
US Naval Area Medical Research Unit No. 2 (NAMRU-2), and position the MoH to be the 
main recipient in Indonesia of potential benefits from vaccine production, both directly in the 
form of funding for research and development, and indirectly through royalties. Below I focus 
on the MoH’s ousting of NAMRU-2 as a particularly useful manifestation of the link between 
the invocation of sovereignty and the MoH’s attempt to strengthen its relative positioning 
within Indonesian health governance. 
 
The virus-sharing dispute and the expulsion of NAMRU-2 from Indonesia 
Before the virus-sharing dispute, the MoH benefited relatively little from the considerable 
sums spent internationally on studying the H5N1 virus and developing a vaccine. Lowe 
(2010: 154) writes: ‘At the start of the Indonesian outbreak in 2003, Indonesia did not have a 
molecular biology laboratory capable of identifying the composition of biological samples 
suspected to be H5N1 influenza virus.’ Subsequent to the outbreaks, some international 
funding became available to support lab improvement. But advanced research and 
development activities were generally carried out by the WHO reference laboratory in Hong 
Kong and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) lab in Atlanta. 
Meanwhile, Indonesia’s leading laboratory – the MoH’s National Institute of Health Research 
and Development (NIHRD) – was mostly focused on H5N1 detection and confirmation in 
virus samples. Even after the outbreaks international funding to the NIHRD lab was limited. 
By 2008, total CDC contribution was only $2 million (USAID 2008: 10).  
25 
By contrast, the US Navy’s NAMRU-2 enjoyed far better funding, mainly from 
various US government sources, and at the time of the outbreaks operated ‘a regional 
“reference lab” for influenza virus testing’ (Lowe 2010: 154). Based in Jakarta since 1991, in 
2006 NAMRU-2 staff numbered 175, of which only 19 were American. There were 44 
Indonesian scientists employed in NAMRU-2, many of whom among the country’s best-
qualified (Ear 2012: 167). In the fiscal year 2006, at the height of the avian flu scare, 
NAMRU-2 received a total of $11 million, $2.6 million of which was special funding 
dedicated to avian and pandemic influenza surveillance (NAS 2007: 208). Operating the 
expensive device used to run simultaneous testing of human respiratory pathogens alone cost 
NAMRU-2 more than $1 million annually (NAS 2007: 64).  
In 2006, as a prelude to the virus-sharing ban, Siti accused NAMRU-2 of espionage 
and violation of Indonesian sovereignty, saying it sent H5N1 specimens out of Indonesia 
without notifying or seeking permission from the MoH. She also publicly speculated that the 
samples were being turned into biological weapons in a secret US government facility in Los 
Alamos (Siti 2008). Siti ordered NAMRU-2’s closure in 2008 and it was finally shut down in 
April 2010.  
To understand why NAMRU-2 became a target for Siti, it is essential to understand 
the extent to which it was embedded within Indonesia’s health governance system, and central 
to alternative surveillance networks that operated beyond the MoH’s control. NAMRU-2’s 
significance and authority, relative to the MoH, only increased as a result of the urgency 
attached to the response to H5N1. 
While there is no evidence to support Siti’s biological weapons allegation, NAMRU-2 
was undoubtedly a prominent node in a health governance network operating within 
Indonesia that was not answerable to the Health Minister (NAS 2007: 69). In the course of the 
decade prior to its closure, the unit’s main purpose had shifted, not without internal resistance, 
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from conducting research on tropical illnesses to disease surveillance, reflecting the growing 
concern worldwide with emerging infectious diseases (Lowe 2010: 157). In effect, funding 
for NAMRU-2 supported ‘a parallel ILI [influenza-like illness] surveillance system’ (USAID 
2008: 10). Because of its superior funding, NAMRU-2 had a deep reach into Indonesia’s 
provinces, often better than the MoH’s, and conducted considerable independent research on 
infectious diseases, including H5N1. A USAID (2008: 11) report thus notes: ‘Through these 
ILI surveillance systems NAMRU has managed to establish very productive relationships 
with key hospitals throughout Indonesia.’ For example, before the virus-sharing ban in 2006 
NAMRU-2 was receiving information regarding H5N1 outbreaks ahead of the MoH, which it 
then forwarded to the CDC, bypassing the MoH. This, according to a review of NAMRU-2’s 
operations, ‘created a delicate situation’ (NAS 2007: 72). Furthermore, the expensive 
equipment NAMRU-2 operated was not available to the Indonesian government. It remained 
Navy-owned and was not to be ‘left behind should the influenza surveillance budget be 
severely curtailed’ (NAS 2007: 71).  
Crucially, NAMRU-2 was not a foreign organ within Indonesia. As mentioned, most 
of the scientists employed in NAMRU-2 were Indonesian and it was deeply embedded within 
Indonesian medical research networks (NAS 2007: 74). In the time before the outbreaks, 
NIHRD and NAMRU-2 staff enjoyed very close relations and often cooperated on particular 
projects or informally. Notable researchers would often move between the NIHRD or 
Eijkman Institute and NAMRU-2. Indeed, Endang Rahayu Sedyaningsih, Siti’s successor as 
health minister and a former Director of the Centre of Biomedical Research and Program 
Development at the NIHRD, was previously a NAMRU-2 researcher and had close personal 
relations with its staff (Jakarta Post, 2 May 2012).  
The appointment in October 2009 of Endang, a world-class medical researcher with a 
Harvard PhD, to the role of Health Minister was seen by many to renew ‘confidence in the 
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rational-legal basis of policymaking in the ministry’ (Ear 2012: 178). It was also criticised by 
some, including Siti herself, who accused Endang of collaborating with NAMRU-2 behind 
her back when she was minister (Jakarta Post, 2 May 2012; Jakarta Globe, 24 October 
2012). Many speculated at the time that Endang would allow NAMRU-2 back into Indonesia 
and the MoH would resume virus-sharing with the WHO. But, contrary to expectations, 
Endang refused to reopen NAMRU-2 and maintained the virus-sharing ban until the 
conclusion of the new international agreement in May 2011. That Endang stuck to the policies 
of the much-maligned Siti, against the expectations of many observers, shows that the 
motivations for the virus-sharing ban run deeper than the personal preferences of an 
individual health minister.  
In line with the broader argument of this article, the expulsion of NAMRU-2 must be 
looked at in relation to the particular context of Indonesian health governance, against the 
backdrop of the global H5N1 crisis. In essence, NAMRU-2 competed directly with the MoH 
for authority, and ultimately funding from international sources, but was vulnerable to the 
MoH’s assertions of sovereignty in a way that the MoA was not. Dennis Normile (quoted in 
Ear 2012), writing in Science magazine, was thus correct to predict that NAMRU-2 would 
‘fall victim to Indonesia’s determination to develop its own research capabilities and take 
control of its H5N1 viral samples.’ But ‘Indonesia’, as we have seen, is not a monolith. The 
strategy emanated from the MoH for specific reasons, associated with its relative weakness.  
There is evidence to suggest that even before the virus-sharing dispute Siti was keen 
for Indonesian government labs to move up the ‘food chain’, because she was angry at a 
WHO statement in May 2006 that the first human-to-human transmission might have 
occurred in Indonesia and was hoping genetic testing would prove her right (Smith 2012: 74). 
And, indeed, the assertion of ‘viral sovereignty’ has paid handsome dividends to MoH-
affiliated research labs in Indonesia, at the expense of alternative centres of medical research. 
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While discussions of a new civilian joint Indonesia-US Center for Biomedical Research and 
Public Health have not yielded tangible results at the time of writing, the NIHRD’s National 
Influenza Center is currently being developed as a new WHO Collaborating Centre, 
specialising in zoonotic influenza. This means significant upgrades to its capacity and 
equipment (Jakarta Post, 4 October 2011). Furthermore, if before the virus-sharing dispute 
NAMRU-2 and NIHRD were the only labs capable of H5N1 detection, in 2007 the MoH 
designated 44 laboratories around Indonesia as centres for H5N1 diagnosis, with the NIHRD 
and Eijkman Institute in Jakarta as main referral labs (Setiawaty 2012: 210). For this the 
NIHRD received substantial funding from several donors to purchase expensive diagnosis and 
detection equipment. It also received lab resources and ongoing capacity building support 
from the WHO (Setiawaty 2012: 210). Importantly, these labs are nationally controlled, not 
an insignificant outcome in the decentralisation era.   
The virus-sharing dispute was also used to attract funding from both international 
sources and other parts of the Indonesian government for vaccine production in Indonesia. 
The government-owned pharmaceutical company PT Bio Farma, which produces routine 
immunisations, has recently expanded its operations to produce both seasonal and avian flu 
vaccines (Lowe 2010: 158). Prior to the H5N1 outbreaks, Indonesians were small consumers 
of seasonal flu vaccine and vaccine production capacity was very low in the country as a 
result. In the new international framework for managing influenza that replaced GISN 
expanding developing countries’ seasonal flu vaccine production is seen as essential for 
increasing world production capacity in preparedness for the surge in output required to meet 
rising needs in case of pandemics (Kamradt-Scott and Lee 2011). But because global 
pharmaceutical companies were concerned to ensure the new agreement did not undermine 
the protection of intellectual property rights (see Smith 2012), they agreed to cooperate with 
developing country producers and provide them with technological knowhow. Japanese 
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manufacturer Biken thus entered into partnership with Bio Farma in 2007 to help the latter 
develop its flu vaccine production capacity. Aside from seasonal vaccine production, several 
institutions, including the MoH, have been engaged, with funding from the Indonesian 
Ministry of Research and Technology, in an effort to develop a H5N1 vaccine to also be 
produced by Bio Farma. It was recently estimated that a locally made vaccine could be widely 
available in 2013 (Jakarta Post, 27 January 2012). 
In summary, the MoH was too weak to claim a greater share of the international 
funding for H5N1 mitigation programs in Indonesia from domestic rivals. As a result, MoH 
officials, including health ministers Siti and Endang, sought to deploy national sovereignty as 
a way of securing funding to research and surveillance activities that the MoH could 
dominate.   
 
Conclusion 
When Siti Fadilah Supari claimed ‘viral sovereignty’ over specimens of the deadly H5N1 
avian influenza virus collected in Indonesia, this was seen by many observers to confirm the 
widely accepted view of Southeast Asia as a region of states dedicated to the preservation of 
hard forms of ‘Westphalian’ sovereignty, even in the face of serious transnational threats. I 
have argued that sovereignty should be seen not as the ends of state action, but as a means 
available to government actors in the pursuit of particular political goals. In this case, the 
deployment of ‘viral sovereignty’ was a generally successful attempt at recentralising 
authority and funding within the central MoH. Prior to Siti’s launching of the virus-sharing 
dispute, the MoH, an already relatively weak ministry, was further weakened by the leakage 
of funding to other state and non-state agencies as a result of the emergence of a more diffuse 
and regulatory global health governance terrain and the advance of government 
decentralisation within Indonesia.  
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Echoing likeminded work (Jones 2012), this article has endeavoured to show that the 
task for future research is identifying the precise circumstances in which claims for national 
sovereignty are made in Southeast Asia, as well as the circumstances in which interventions 
are allowed, or even encouraged, by governments. The insistence on characterising the 
region’s states in terms of their dedication to Westphalian sovereignty risks ignoring or 
downplaying the significance of very important developments occurring just underneath that 
surface and which offer a more accurate reading of the region’s political dynamics.    
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